Ethnic Inequality, Multiculturalism and Globalization.

The cases of Brazil, Bolivia and Peru.

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Keywords: ethnic inequality, multiculturalism, Latin America

Summary

Latin America is a region of profound ethnic inequalities. There exists, in particular, a significant socioeconomic gap between the populations of predominantly European heritage and the Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations. In this context of high levels of ethnic inequality and diverse forms of discrimination, this paper compares the recent evolution of Afro and Indigenous communities and movements in three regional countries: Brazil, Bolivia and Peru. Our analysis shows that, as the consequence of different processes triggered by globalization, in the three countries Afro movements and Indigenous communities are increasingly fighting against the diverse forms of discrimination and developing their own specific cultural identities. Also, we argue that recent changes in the three countries’ legal and constitutional frameworks indicate that they are increasingly adopting a multicultural (instead of assimilationist) stance regarding Afro-descendant and Indigenous issues. The positive recognition of ethnic rights that is happening in these and many other regional countries, however, has yet to produce more concrete results as the data on inequality clearly shows.

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Introduction

The first part of this article summarizes recent evidence on ethnic inequality in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru and argues that at least part of this inequality is due to discriminatory barriers. We show that Afro-descendants in Brazil and Indigenous individuals in Bolivia and Peru do remarkably worse in a variety of socio-economic indicators such as poverty rates, hourly wages, infant mortality and access to basic services. Although class and regional differences between ethnic groups account for part of this inequality, it is also necessary to be aware of several contemporary discriminatory process that affect negatively Afro-descendant and Indigenous groups. In particular, we agree with recent studies that structural, statistical, and taste-based forms of discrimination play a major explanatory role and demand the implementation of ethnic-based policies to alleviate this problem.

The second part shows that the three states have been increasingly adopting multiculturalist (instead of assimilationist) policies that combat ethnic inequality and discrimination. Brazil’s current Constitution, for instance, defines racism as a crime without bail for the first time in its history. Bolivia and Peru, in turn, modified their Constitutions and officially accepted that they are multinational and multiethnic countries. The 1993 last Peruvian Constitution establishes that “the State recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the Nation”, acknowledges Quechua and Aymara as official languages, and admits customary law and collective property rights for Indigenous populations. Bolivia is not behind. Its 1994 Constitution defines the country as “free, independent, sovereign, multiethnic and pluricultural”. The State also promotes bilingual education in Aymara, Quechua and Guarani and protects customary law and collective property ownership of the land. At the same time, the Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations are reshaping their identities and movements, increasingly fighting for their right to become non-discriminated citizens and changing past national identities that did not take them into account.

The third section of the paper argues why a comparative perspective gives us a better understanding of the change towards multiculturalism that is occurring in these three countries and claims that globalization is a key factor to explain it. As it has been put forward, today’s world is partly shaped by two opposite forces: the struggle to preserve local identities—ethnic, national, religious—and the expansion of globalization. The commemoration of the 500 hundred years of the conquest of the
Americas in 1992 triggered in many Latin American countries movements of resistance from historically discriminated populations, mainly of Indigenous and afro descent. Comparing two Andean countries with high percentages of Indigenous population and Brazil, the country with the highest percentage of Afro-descendants in Latin America, will help to understand how this struggle between identity and globalization operates quite similarly, even in different social contexts. Thus, our “cross-national comparison must place [these three countries] within systemic processes operating at levels ‘beneath’ and ‘above’ the nation state” (McMichael 1990 p.386). Brazilian, Bolivian and Peruvian national identities, like pressed with a clamp, are being reshaped from beneath by discriminated Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, and from above by supranational forces such as the flow of investments and the expansion of western cultural industries.

I. Ethnic Inequality and Discrimination in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru

Latin America is widely acknowledged to be the most unequal region in the world. The huge levels of Latin American inequality are far from ethnically blind. In particular, systematic evidence shows a significant socioeconomic gap between Latin Americans of European descent (usually called “whites”) and the populations of Indigenous or African background. According to a recent study, the average ratio of non-white to white poverty is between 1.67 and 2.76, conditional on the particular measure of poverty used (Busso, Cicowiez and Gasparini 2005: 85). Sharp differences between whites and non-whites have been also found in other critical dimensions such as education, access to water and sewage, labor income, justice verdicts and life expectancy (Busso, Cicowiez and Gasparini 2005; Rangel 2005; World Bank 2003; Hall and Patrinos 2006; del Popolo and Oyarce 2005).

Brazil, Bolivia and Peru do not escape from this regional trend. Regardless of the particular method of racial classification used, all available studies show that the Indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru and the Afro-descendant population in Brazil are remarkably worse than the non-Indigenous / non-Afro-descendant population (Bello and Rangel 2000; Busso, Cicowiez and Gasparini 2005; OIT 2007; World Bank 2003).
In Brazil, around 75 million people self-classify as Afro-descendant (45% of the country’s population). This makes Brazil the country with the largest Afro-descendant population outside the African continent and where more than half of all Afro-Latinos live. In Bolivia and Peru (as in other regional countries with substantial numbers of Indigenous individuals such as Mexico, Ecuador and Guatemala) the proportion of the population classifiable as Indigenous is subject of controversy. In particular, scholars discuss whether language spoken and/or self-classification should be used as criteria to distinguish between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals (Busso, Cicowiez and Gasparini 2005; Mejia and Moncada 2000; del Popolo and Oyarce 2005). Still, regardless of the method of classification chosen, it is safe to conclude that in Bolivia and Peru, the Indigenous population represents a large proportion of each country’s population (between 50% and 70% in Bolivia and 30% and 50% in Peru).

Table 1 compares Afro and white Brazilians and Indigenous and non-Indigenous Bolivians and Peruvians in a variety of socioeconomic indicators. Many patterns are worth noting. First, Afro-Brazilians, Indo-Peruvians and Indo-Bolivians are much more likely to be poor than the rest of each country’s population, being Brazil the country with the biggest ethnic poverty gap. In consonance with Afro-descendant and Indigenous greater poverty rates, these groups are also more likely to lack access to critical goods and services. For instance, both in urban and rural areas, Afro-descendants and Indigenous groups are less likely to live in households with hygienic restrooms. The data also show significant differences in schooling, probably the most important indicator of human capital levels. Although primary education has become almost universal for all ethnic groups in the three countries, there remain substantial differences in the access to the secondary and tertiary levels. In addition, the overall mean schooling of Afro and Indigenous groups is between 2 and 4 years lower than that

1 Scholars usually consider Afro-Brazilians those who choose the “pardo” (brown) or “preto” (black) categories in the race question applied by the Census and official household surveys. Pardos are the great majority of Afro-descendants (90%), which probably reflects the combined effects of the Brazilian version of ideology of “mestizaje”, miscegenation (which has been more popular than in the U.S.) and the lower social prestige attributed to the “preto” category.

2 A tiny proportion of the Brazilian population self-classifies as Indigenous while there is a small but non-negligible percentage of Afro-descendants in Bolivia and Peru. The social situation of these particular groups merit further analysis although it seems reasonable to assume that in most indicators, Indigenous Brazilians are closer to Afro-Brazilians than whites and, similarly, Afro-Peruvians and Afro-Bolivians are closer to each country’s Indigenous than non-Indigenous (mestizo-white) populations.

3 For simplicity, we label “whites” non-Indigenous Bolivians and Peruvians. It must be noted, however, that many (if not most) of these “whites” would prefer to define themselves as “mestizos”, in accordance with the strong social influence of the ideology of mestizaje in these countries.
of the white population. Human capital differences, in turn, probably account for part of the significant differences found between ethnic groups in the labor market. For instance, whites’ hourly wages are 2.02, 1.91 and 1.65 times higher in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru respectively. Certainly, whites’ greater labor income derives in part from the fact that they are more likely to work in better-paid occupations than Afro and Indigenous workers. This can be easily proven by looking at the much greater proportions of Afro and Indigenous workers in the primary sector in the three countries or by noting that Afro-descendants and Indigenous workers are strongly over-represented in unskilled occupations and under-represented among managers, professionals and technicians (OIT 2007). Finally, table 1 also shows that Afro-Brazilians, Indo-Bolivians and Indo-Peruvians have greater infant mortality rates, one of the most popular indicators of health inequality.

The existence of such ethnic inequalities long after the abolition of slavery and official discrimination is a puzzling trend. Historically, the predominant explanation of this phenomenon emphasized the combined effects of class and regional differences between these groups and the dominant populations. For instance, the pioneer studies on Brazilian racial inequality sustained that the overrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians among the poor reflected the combined effects of their disadvantaged starting points (slave descendants with low physical and human capital levels) and of a highly hierarchical class system that obstructed social mobility (Thales de Azevedo 1955; Wagley 1968; Fernandes 1965). According to this perspective, thus, the problem to be addressed if racial differences were to be overcome was to combat the huge class inequalities and low levels of social mobility that characterized the Brazilian society. Similarly, the first wave of studies on Indigenous and white inequalities pointed to the effects of differences in rates of urbanization and levels of human capital between these groups. For instance, one of the first econometric works on wage inequality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in Bolivia, concluded that most of the ethnic wage gap among workers in rural areas was explained by differences in endowments, especially schooling (Kelley, 1988).
Table 1: Indicators of Ethnic Inequality in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Brazil Afros</th>
<th>Brazil Whites</th>
<th>Bolivia Indig.</th>
<th>Bolivia Whites</th>
<th>Peru Indig.</th>
<th>Peru Whites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization Rate</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<th>Education</th>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy Rates (10-65 Years)</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net Enrollment Rates (Primary)</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net Enrollment Rates (Secondary)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.66</td>
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<th>Labor Market</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rates (Males, in %)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rates (Females, in %)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males in the Primary Sector</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratio of Hourly Wage(^a)</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.91</td>
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<td>1.65</td>
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<th>Living Conditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Poverty Rate</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Household Per Capita Income(^b)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Hygienic Restrooms (Urban)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Hygienic Restrooms (Rural)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Computed as the Ratio of the White and Afro (Indigenous) hourly wages; \(^b\) Computed as the Ratio of the White and Afro (Indigenous) Household Per Capita Income.

Sources: Busso et al. 2005; del Popolo and Oyarce (2005); Hall and Patrinos (2006). All data are based on official surveys or censuses collected after 2000.

Recently, these kind of perspectives have been challenged by a variety of works that stress the continuing significance of racially discriminatory practices and question the assumption that racial discrimination constitutes a marginal and transitory phenomenon or only a particular manifestation of class prejudices. These works argue that there exist at least three different types of discrimination that currently affect the lives of Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples.

First, some scholars argue that a number of laws and public policies that seem to have neutral or harmless ethnic effects actually affect negatively the socio-economic performance of Afro-descendant and Indigenous individuals; this type of discrimination is sometimes referred as “structural discrimination”. One clear example is the almost complete absence of bilingual programs of education in schools until the 1990s. This probably created much greater barriers for the Indigenous population due to the fact that
a significant proportion of Indigenous individuals does not use Spanish as a first language or even does not speak Spanish at all (Bello and Rangel 2002).

“Statistical discrimination” is another phenomenon that is argued to exist in the region. Statistical discrimination is the differential treatment of individuals based on observable characteristics that are correlated with certain undesired behaviors, but which may or may not accrue to the person in question (World Bank 2003). For instance, it is argued that employers’ negative stereotypes about Afro and Indigenous groups diminish the chances of Afro and Indigenous workers in the job selection process because employers usually activate these prejudices when they have to decide between a set of Afro (Indigenous) and white job applicants with similar qualifications.

Finally, some scholars and activists also stress that the Latin American region is not exempt from the problem of “pure” discrimination, defined as differential treatment of individuals because of ethnic or racial features (skin color, dress, accent, etc.) that are “distasteful” to the discriminator.

How Indigenous and afro communities in Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru have responded recently to these diverse manifestations of inequality and discrimination is what we will try to answer in the next section.

II. The turn towards Multiculturalism

Assimilation and multiculturalism are two different integration strategies followed by—or towards to—minority or subordinate ethnic groups to the rest of the population in which they are inserted. The assimilation strategy consists of a process of integration adopting as much as possible the cultural patterns of the dominant culture—language, education, clothes, religiosity, or family relations. Assimilation can be a strategy developed by the state, a public policy, by which different groups are forced or convinced with specific benefits to adopt the dominant culture. But it can also be a strategy developed by the groups themselves if they are convinced that it is the best way to integrate. The multicultural strategy differs to the previous one because now the groups will try to integrate maintaining as much as they can their own culture, typically building hyphenated-identities, which express their belonging to two identities at the same time. Again, multiculturalism can be a strategy favored by the state (in which case the state must protect, recognize and grant cultural diversity) but also by the ethnic
populations. There is still a third way of “integration”, which is neither assimilation nor multiculturalism, and this is segregation. This is the case when an ethnic community lives as much isolated as it can, without making the effort to learn the new language, or create ties with the outer population; it is the typical case of the ghettos. Of course, segregation can be also a strategy developed from the states towards certain ethnic groups that are not welcomed.

If we apply this analytical framework to our case studies adding a timeline to better understand the integration of Indigenous and black populations in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru we have three different periods described in Figure 1.

The segregation period started in the colonial regime and lasted until 1930 approximately. During this period, the strategies from the Brazilian, Bolivian and Peruvian states towards ethnic minorities were all based on their presumed “natural inferiority”, so they were enslaved or marginalized and never considered part of the nations (i). Throughout all this period there was no strategy developed from the subordinate communities due to the extreme weakness of their situation (ii).

The assimilation period took place between 1930s-50s. In this stage, under the influence of Indigenismo and nationalist ideologies, Indigenous populations and blacks were encouraged to assimilate to become useful citizens in the productive system (iii). It is at this time also when the integration through mixtures of bloods becomes a part of national identity: Latin America as the mestizo continent, with its “cosmic race”, or miscegenated population, that avoided racial conflict and met harmonious integration of cultures. Indigenous and afro-descendant populations followed at this period the status quo and tried to assimilate accepting political cooptation, and hiding their ethnic origins (iv). It was better to be considered a campesino than an Indian, and mulatto was better than being black or Afro-Brazilian, as campesinos, mestizos and mulattos were a little whiter and therefore closer to the dominant stereotype.

Finally, since the 1990s to present the three states have started an approach of multicultural integration, reforming their constitutions, promoting and recognizing cultural and ethnic diversity (v). All these countries, for instance, have recognized that they are pluri-ethnic or multinational societies in their most recent Constitutional amendments. At the same time, the communities have also developed multicultural strategies attempting to become part of the countries without giving away their own cultural identity (vi). These reshaped ethnic identities are anchored in different systems of symbols constructed from ancient ethnic heroes (Zumbi, Pachacutec), alternative
religions (Afro-Brazilian religions, pre-colonial myths), territorial autonomy (quilombos, Indigenous reservations, communal lands,), pre-colonial histories (Africa, Tahantinsuyu, Kollasuyo) music (samba-reggae, Andean rhythms), and physical appearance (skin color, phenotype), among other sources of inspiration. Both the Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations are fighting for their right to become citizens without discrimination expanding or changing past national identities that did not take them into account. The remainder of this section will show more in detail how each of our case studies are increasingly becoming multicultural societies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 1. Analytical framework to understand strategies of integration towards/from blacks and Indians in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Segregation</strong> (Colonial period, Independence until 1930s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the State (Public Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Slavery; marginalization, “scientific racism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the minority or subordinate group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) No strategy, completely dominated</td>
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*Source: adaptation from Arocena-Aguiar (2007)*

**Multiculturalism in Brazil**

There has never been a unified national black social movement in Brazil. According to some analyses, in the late 1970s there were six hundred institutions that had racism as one of their main flags, including religious, sports, music, cultural and grassroots organizations. In 1978 the Unified Black Movement (Movimento Negro Unificado) was created with the aim of unifying all the scattered efforts and giving a political voice to the defense of the black movement (UNDP Brazil 2005). Although this attempt at unification failed, the institution was able to reach most of the country and gave new energy to the movement. Other institutions have appeared more recently, like the National Meeting of Black Institutions (Encontro Nacional de Entidades Negras-Enen), created in Sao Paulo in 1991, the National Coordination of Black Institutions (Coordenação Nacional de Entidades Negras-Conen) and the National Coordination of Quilombolas Communities (Coordenação Nacional de Comunidades
Quilombolas-Conaq). There was a new and more recent mobilization, connected to the World Conference Against Racism, which was held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. While Brazil was preparing to participate in that meeting there was a very significant debate about the question, and this was echoed in the public ambit with the First National Conference Against Racism and Intolerance in Rio de Janeiro. Besides this, after the Durban conference the government set up a National Council to Fight Discrimination (Conselho Nacional de Combate a Discriminação) and a number of black pride movements such as Olodum from Bahia, Black Rio and Articulation of Brazilian Black Women have acquired great influence. These movements and institutions have created a new consciousness about racial problems in the country, and they are supported by very convincing data that speaks volumes about racism in Brazil (Da Silva 2004, Htun 2005).

Nowadays these organized communities are constructing their own cultural identities, which nearly always do not match the myth of a “racial democracy” in Brazil that Gilberto Freyre’s writings so successfully and brilliantly enthroned in a dominant position (Freyre 1989, Htun 2004, Arocena 2008). One extremely significant symptom is that Afro organizations have chosen Zumbi as their ethnic symbol. Zumbi lived three hundred years ago and acquired fame as the leader of Palmares, the biggest “quilombo” (segregated communities of escaped slaves who resisted white domination). The national holiday for black movements is November 20th, the day of Zumbi’s death, which was made National Black Consciousness Day, rather than May 13th, the day slavery was abolished in 1888, which is now the official National Day Against Racism. Another symptom is that some of Brazil’s historical heroes like Duke of Caxias are now being strongly criticized because of their negative treatment of blacks. And these black and ethnic communities are now building their defenses on racial and ethnic bases.

The increasing importance of Afro-descendendant social movements has been accompanied and reinforced by a number of ethnic-based public policies that intend to address the severe racial inequalities that exist in Brazil.

In the 1988 Constitution ethnic and cultural diversity was recognized for the first time ever in Brazil, and the government acknowledged that it had a duty to protect different cultures and incorporate them as part of the national identity. In that Constitution, for the first time, racism was treated as a crime punishable with imprisonment without bail, and affirmative action policies were established. These policies consist of special scholarships for black and Indigenous populations to prepare
themselves for public competitions for state jobs, quotas for public-sector employment and universities, and financial assistance to study for the exam to enter public universities (Lloyd 2004a and b; Roberge 2006). Some states such as Bahia have reached the point of implementing quotas in the advertising industry. This last measure is very important because blacks are seriously under-represented in the media. One study found that on three of the main national TV channels in 59 hours at peak viewing time, black people appeared only in 39 advertisements, they only spoke in 9, and they only featured prominently in 4 (UNDP Brazil 2005). From 1,245 characters listed in 258 Brazilian novels 79.8% are white, 7.9% black and 6.1% mestizo. Also 84.5% of the main characters are white and only 5.8% black. The absolute majority of the black characters, 73.5%, are poor, and almost every character of the intellectual elite, 90%, is white (UNDP Brazil 2005).

Apart from this, two very important laws based on affirmative action policies are now under scrutiny—The Statute for the Equality of Race, and The Quota Law—and the arguments supporting or criticizing them are reshaping what Brazilians thought about their democratic racial integration. For example, one book’s title is very suggestive: We Are Not Racists (Kamel 2006), and it attempts a defense of the harmonious integration. On the contrary, on the justification that senator Paulo Paim (2006) does of The Statute, Brazil is perceived as a country with chronic racism, and blacks and mulattos are redefined as Afro-Brazilians, classification that according to the new law should inform a wide range of public policies based on affirmative action and quotas. This new hyphenated identity and the discussion of the racial question are reshaping Brazil’s national identity (Downie 2001; Telles 2001; Lobato 2003; Ferreira 2007).

In sum, Brazilian ethnic identity is at a crucial moment of redefinition. What appeared in the past to be a successful integration of races is now under searching scrutiny. Black movements have efficiently deconstructed the hegemonic self-image that the country is a positive model for democratic coexistence between different ethnic groups. Many foreigners of African descent who visit Brazil have been surprised to find themselves faced with subtle forms of discrimination. Awareness of the problem has reached government institutions, and legislation has been passed to mitigate racial discrimination in different ways, but there is still a long way to go.
Before the Spaniards conquered the Inca Empire, there was a multi-ethnic nation of Aymara, Quechua and other native cultures that made up a confederation of nations called Tahuantinsuyo, which included parts of what are now Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. During the colonial period, due to their supposed “natural inferiority” Indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru were segregated and marginalized, sometimes used as forced labor, others maintained apart in pseudo evangelized “Pueblos de indios” (Yrigoyen 2002). The independence didn’t change much, because the new nations were constructed as images of Western, Catholic, and White countries with no place for Indians. Thus, national identity did not include Indigenous populations nor their rights, and what emerged were nation-states without Indians, preoccupied with building one state, one population, and one homogenized nation, formed by Europeanized mestizos (Stavenhagen 2002). A special reference has to be made to the politics of Indigenismo, developed since the 1930s onwards, because there can be some mistaken perception due to its name. Indigenismo politics, even if it used well-educated rhetoric towards Indians, had as its objective the integration of the native population to make them useful citizens. Communication, education and integration policies were developed for this purpose of assimilating the Indigenous population and aligning them with developmental policies; Indigenous populations were referred as campesinos, in spite the label of Indigenismo (Marroquín 1972). But what was not included in these Indigenista projects was the recognition of their own cultures, with the right to language, collective property of land, and education in Quechua or Aymara. For that we still had to wait to the last decade of the twentieth century.

The current Indigenous mobilization in the Andean region started to gain real strength in 1992, at the time of the celebrations of the five hundredth anniversary of the arrival of Columbus in the Americas. The Indigenous organizations, supported by a number of NGOs and with money flowing in from developed countries, shifted from demands for a kind of leftist agenda to demands much more centered on questions of ethnicity and autonomy, both cultural and territorial. This shift can also be described as a movement from assimilation to multiculturalism. This process can well be exemplified by the shift from the identification of campesino to Indigenous; while the first is defined by the economic position in the productive process, the latter is associated with a specific cultural identity and history (Albó 1994; 2002).
In Bolivia, “after the 1952 Revolution, the MNR-run state used the sindicato (peasant union) model to bring highland Indians into the national economic and political schemes. In essence, this model was assimilationist in character, using and eliding the traditional land holding patterns and forms of social organization to make the varied Indian groups into campesinos, a group defined by class rather than ethnicity” (Postero 2000). Some of the Indians’ struggles since the 1990s stress exactly the opposite, the preeminence of ethnicity over class, of culture over political ideology.

Two Indigenous Bolivian movements are particularly remarkable: the Movement for Socialist Action (Movimiento Acción Socialista-MAS) and the Indigenous Movement Pachacuti (Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti-MIP).

The MAS is Bolivia’s current president (Evo Morales) political party. On December 18th 2005 Evo Morales became the first Indigenous president of Bolivia, and he won the elections with 52% of the votes cast, an overall majority, which was also the first in the history of the country. His clear majority means he has been able to take power without making alliances in the Congress. Morales said, “(It is)...a great honor to be the first Indigenous president ... a stage in history has ended, the neo-liberal model has come to an end and a model of doing politics has also finished.” Ex-president Carlos Mesa said, “It is necessary for the country to have one Indigenous president.” Morales achieved his popularity as the defender of the peasants that live from the growing of the coca leaves. The United States pressured the Bolivian government to ban coca fields and promised in exchange to provide monetary aid so that the peasants and Indians would be able to convert to other crops. But their income from these other crops never came up to what they earned from coca and there was widespread discontent. For the peasants, coca is an ancient and traditional crop which is used for many purposes but not to make cocaine, although they do make their money selling the leaves to drug traffickers. Morales capitalized on this discontent and became known as the “cocalero leader”. The MAS, currently the largest political party in the country, says it does not seek to divide the country but to transform it. Isaac Bigio, a specialist in Bolivian conflicts from the London School of Economics, says that some think this is a synonym for shy reformism and conciliation with the whites (“blancoïdes”), while others believe it is a real and viable multicultural plan of action in the context of an interrelated capitalist world. Evo Morales could become the new Indigenous Mandela who could end racial apartheid in the Andes, but alternatively he might become the head of a new bloody uprising, like the one that occurred fifty years ago (Bigio’s website 2002).
The MIP (Indigenous Movement Pachacuti) is headed by a native Aymara called Felipe Quispe. Quispe is an ex-guerrilla leader (Ejército Guerrillero Túpak Katari) who was in prison for five years and was freed in 1997. Then, he was elected Secretary General of one of the workers’ unions (Confederación Sindical Unión de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia-CSUCTB) and later he founded the MIP. His political rhetoric has gradually shifted from Marxist positions and the defense of traditional Andean communities (the ayllus), to a very nationalistic and separatist platform. He probably leads one of the most radicalized Indigenous movements in Latin America. His political ideas are strongly influenced by Fausto Reinaga, a theorist who proposed the unification of Quechuas and Aymaras and a social system based on their ancestral religiosity and cosmology. Reinaga has been severely criticized from the left, who says he is playing the game of the right against workers’ unions, and from the right because of his call for racial confrontation.

Under Quispe’s influence, the MIP has created an identity of resistance (Castells 1997, Arocena 1997) and its selected enemies are the white population, the Catholic Church, the State of Bolivia, capitalism and globalization. Their followers define themselves in ethnic and racial terms. They follow their own traditional religion with its center in the sun (Inti), the land (Pachamama) and the mountains (Apus); they have their own calendar, which reckons 5,511 years; they want to separate from Bolivia and create an independent state; and they will continue to organize their communities without a money market economy and outside globalization. Pachacuti’s aim is to create a new sovereign country, the Republic of Quillasuyo (or Kollasuyu) named after one of the four regions of the old empire when the Incas conquered the Aymaras. In Quispe’s own words: “Indians are a majority in Bolivia (between 60 and 80% of the population), and as the historical majority we are decided to self govern, to dictate our own laws, to change the Constitution of the state for our Constitution, to change the capitalist system for our communitarian system, to change the Bolivian flag of three colors for our seven color flag” (La jornada 2003). This new Republic will have also its own national anthem, its own symbols, it will be organized without money and there will be no economic inequality, “much as the way we are already living in many of our communities”, Quispe says.

The MIP contributed to the downfall of the last two Presidents: Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (Goni) and Carlos Mesa. It won 6% of the votes in 2002 but in 2005 elections only 2%. If this is a political defeat against Morales, we should not be
mistaken about Quispe’s still strong influence among Aymara people and his capacity to mobilize them when the time comes to fight Morales, who is been called a traitor.

As we can observe, the MAS is less radical than the MIP because it plays by the accepted rules of politics. Indeed, although the MAS is leftist and radical its political agenda follows more or less the same pattern of political ideology as in the past: socialism, nationalization, anti-imperialism, rights for the Indians and better living conditions. These demands can be defended in a more or less aggressive fashion, with more or less radical action, but they are demands that come from within the Bolivian political system. On the other hand, the rhetoric and identity of Quispe’s MIP are grounded outside the system and in opposition to it, and this is why it is seen as much more radical. Morales and Quispe sometimes acted together, but at other times Morales had to assume the voice of reasonableness to avoid plunging Bolivian politics into a storm that might fragment the country in who knows how many parts.

Regarding the Peruvian case, today there is a small and radical political movement called the Pachakutek Movement for the Liberation of Tahuantinsuyu (Movimiento Pachakutek para la Liberación del Tahuantinsuyu-MPLT). There are various other ways of writing the word like Pachacuti or Pachacutec, which was the name of one of the most famous Inca emperors, but it also means revival or reawakening of the Quechua language. They claim their basic objective is to reconstruct the old Tahuantinsuyo Inca community and break free from the oppressive State of Peru, which is perceived as a continuation of the old colonial Spanish domination of their region and culture. While there are still no significant Indigenous political parties in Peru, some Indo-Peruvians are winning political positions. For example, according to a study by the anthropologist Ivan Degregori, in the department of Ayacucho only one municipality in ten had a Quechua-speaking major in 1966, but thirty years later all ten mayors spoke the language, six had Quechua names and seven were of Inca origin (The Economist 2004b). Apart from this, in Peru “the international advocacy networks and conservationist alliances of Amazonian movements in the 1980 and 1990s helped create the ideological space necessary for Andeans to reevaluate their ‘peasant’ status and consider exchanging it for, or combining it with, that of ‘Indigenous’” (Greene 2005).

Unlike Brazil, quota systems and affirmative action policies have not been implemented in Bolivia and Peru. However, Indigenous populations know very well that they must mobilize to make the governments take the action that is needed to protect their cultures and guarantee equal rights. In some cases, as in Quispe’s
movement, there are signs of extremism, and it is not clear where this will lead. It is not difficult to understand their frustration because discrimination has been so cruel and has gone on for so long. It is precisely because of this that multicultural policies have to be strengthened, and quickly, as they are the best defense against separation and radicalization. Racial mixing has not been successful in bringing about integration, and assimilation theories are just a way of sweeping the problem under the carpet. Grandiose ideas such as a “cosmic race”, “racial democracy” and ethnic mixtures have not diminished poverty, lack of education, exploitation and a variety of other social problems that these populations suffer to a far greater extent than white Latin Americans. The inclination to move towards radicalized positions will be fueled if real attempts to promote anti-discriminatory measures are not perceived or are ignored.

III. Conclusion. Globalization and Multiculturalism

It is no coincidence that in the very different social, historical and demographic contexts of Brazil, Bolivia and Peru, and in a little more than a decade, the turn towards multiculturalism has taken place challenging the ideologies of miscegenation, mestizaje and assimilation. The claim of this paper is that the multicultural turn that we described before is linked to the process of globalization and its dialectic consequence of a new consciousness that stresses the importance of defending cultural diversity. (Huntington 1996; Castells 1997, Lafer 2000)

One way to address globalization’s impact on local cultures is to recognize at least three of its associated processes: the increase in the flows of capital investments in extractive industries, the increase in the flows of cultural goods, and the increase in the flows of people.

Investments in Latin America in extracting industries (mining, quarrying and petroleum) grew from 599 million dollars to 3,580 million during the ten-year period 1988 to 1997 (UNDP 2004). Particularly the Andean region, including Peru and Bolivia, is one of the areas with the greatest investments. Many of these developments targeted territories with high percentages of Indigenous people or owned by Indigenous communities, that had to cope with the invasion of their lands, the arrival of new roads and workers, and the transformation of their environment with mega infrastructure projects. These communities also witnessed the exploitation of their natural and highly
valued resources. For instance, traditional plants with medicinal properties discovered after centuries of local practices (such as the Ayahuasca plant in the Amazon region and the Maca plant in Peru) were now patented as new medicines by multinational laboratories. It should be mentioned also how in Bolivia several Indigenous movements gained strength during their opposition to the privatization of the water resources in Cochabamba and the eradication of the traditional coca leaf fields in the Chapare region, which gave great support and visibility to Evo Morales. Brazil is not behind, and the expansion of the deforestation of the Amazon rain forest to supply the wood and paper industries or to gain land for agriculture, as well as the mining projects, have affected Indigenous communities but also hundreds of quilombos. After dire conflicts local reactions to these global investments were finally taken into account by the new constitutions of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil that incorporated their rights to these lands and to decide what to do or not to do with it.

Besides the impacts of investments in extracting industries, globalization expresses itself in the expansion of the flows of western cultural goods, including the music, film and television cultural industries. It is important to remember that in these three countries, as in most Latin American countries, there has been a constant migration from rural areas to urban cities. Lima and La Paz have seen growing numbers of Indigenous individuals arriving to urban areas and most of the time living in miserable economic and social conditions and marginalized from the wealthy areas. It is interesting to remember that in La Paz, Evo Morales’s mother was not allowed to enter Plaza Murillo because it was not a place for Indians to go. These poor populations that settled in the borders of Lima and La Paz were exposed to radio and television and through videos and Dvds to the film industry. They never saw their culture represented in the media, their problems treated in the imported TV programs, their language heard on the radio, or their landscape represented in foreign movies. So the exposure to these cultural goods and the lack of national cultural production ended up generating a sense of cultural alienation and a demand for identity. Or, as Clifford Geertz (1973) described it, the necessity to be and have a name, mixed with the will to be modern and part of the new times that come. It is easy to understand that Brazilian black population falls under the same conditions, but we need to mention one more thing here. Even if in Brazil, as in the rest of the world, the presence of US films is absolutely dominant, a vigorous TV industry has developed. However this did not bring significant benefits to the Afro-descendant population because whites (or light mulattos at best) were depicted as the
positive, powerful and beautiful characters while blacks were only the lag and heavy weight that had to be carried by the owners of the country.

The third process of globalization that we think helps to explain the trend towards multiculturalism is the flow of people. Two different dimensions like migration and tourism can represent this flow. South America is not a land where people arrive from other counties any more, as it was at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th. But it is one of the regions from where millions started to migrate in the last decades, especially to Europe and the United States. Last year Spanish census counted 200 thousand Bolivians, 136 thousand Peruvians and 113 thousand Brazilians living in Spain, most of them arriving during the 1990s. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated for 2006 that 82 thousand Bolivians, 435 thousand Peruvians and a smaller number of Brazilians (not more than 50 thousands) were living in the United States. This huge migration wave departing from these countries has had different consequences. One is that the money in remittances is growing fast and being more and more significant for Bolivians and Peruvians staying home who are able to achieve a better economic position. Secondly, many of the people that migrate maintain a strong cultural bond with their homeland that sometimes is even deepened as a consequence of the cultural shock. Third, much of these diasporas get organized, develop communication among themselves, learn to know citizens’ rights, are exposed to experiences of multiculturalism abroad, and also suffer discrimination. All of these experiences are transmitted to their locals back at the home country. Fourth, a very important dimension of globalization associated with multiculturalism in these countries is tourism. Millions of tourists arrive each year to Bolivia and Peru to appreciate the Inca culture, its stone architecture, the trails through the Andes, the ruins of Macchu Picchu or the Aymara communities by Lake Titicaca. Large numbers of tourists also go to Brazil, seeking to experience the black music of Salvador, the old part of Pelourinho and its Carnival; Rio de Janeiro’s black sensuality or the contagious rhythms of samba. Probably, these legions of tourists have had an impact on the self-esteem of Indigenous and black populations. It is easy to understand that many will think that there must be something interesting and good in them if millions of people come from so long to know their culture and ways of life. We must remember here that lack of self-esteem, as so brilliantly was expressed by Frantz Fanon, (1967) is a typical syndrome of colonized and dominated populations, which inhibits all kind of opposition and organization. Instead, now we can find phrases stamped on t-shirts that read “black is beautiful” or
“100 black”; we can also see the pride in the use of traditional Indigenous clothes or in the use of their native languages. Even further, now more and more people self identify as Indians in Bolivia and Peru, leaving aside the mestizo or campesino categories which hide their ethnic origin. And in Brazil, estimations conclude that for the first time in its history the Afro-descendant population (adding blacks and “pardos”) will be the absolute majority by 2010 (IBGE 2008), which is mainly a consequence of people accepting their blackness, instead of hiding it.

This way of looking at multiculturalism through globalization leaves us on a better position to draw some broader conclusions from our case studies. First, our three cases get linked together through “incorporated comparison”, because they can be interpreted as “divergent manifestations of a singular process”, or as “outcomes [that] may appear individually as self evident units of analysis, but in reality are interconnected processes” (McMichael 1990: 396). And secondly, our research can be considered as evidence that contributes to support the more general theoretical approach that binds together globalization and the manifestation of the demand for multiculturalism, independently of the specific context and ways in which it appears.

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